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Abstract
We consider the multi-armed bandit setting with a twist. Rather than having just one
decision maker deciding which arm to pull in each round, we have n different decision makers
(agents). In the simple stochastic setting, we show that a “free-riding” agent observing another
“self-reliant” agent can achieve just O(1) regret, as opposed to the regret lower bound of Ω(log t)
when one decision maker is playing in isolation. This result holds whenever the self-reliant
agent’s strategy satisfies either one of two assumptions: (1) each arm is pulled at least γ ln t
times in expectation for a constant γ that we compute, or (2) the self-reliant agent achieves
o(t) realized regret with high probability. Both of these assumptions are satisfied by standard
zero-regret algorithms. Under the second assumption, we further show that the free rider only
needs to observe the number of times each arm is pulled by the self-reliant agent, and not the
rewards realized.
In the linear contextual setting, each arm has a distribution over parameter vectors, each
agent has a context vector, and the reward realized when an agent pulls an arm is the inner
product of that agent’s context vector with a parameter vector sampled from the pulled arm’s
distribution. We show that the free rider can achieve O(1) regret in this setting whenever the
free rider’s context is a small (in L2-norm) linear combination of other agents’ contexts and
all other agents pull each arm Ω(log t) times with high probability. Again, this condition on
the self-reliant players is satisfied by standard zero-regret algorithms like UCB. We also prove
a number of lower bounds.
1 Introduction
We consider situations where exploitation must be balanced with exploration in order to obtain
optimal performance. Typically there is a single decision maker who does this balancing, in order
to minimize a quantity called the regret. In this paper we consider settings where there are many
agents and ask how a single agent (the free rider) can benefit from the exploration of other self-
reliant agents. For example, competing pharmaceutical companies might be engaged in research
for drug discovery. If one of these companies had access to the research findings of its competitors,
it might greatly reduce its own exploration cost. Of course, this is an unlikely scenario since
intellectual property is jealously guarded by companies, which points to an important consideration
in modeling such scenarios: the amount and type of information that one agent is able to gather
about the findings of others.
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More realistically, and less consequentially, a recommendation system such as YelpTM makes
user ratings of restaurants publicly available. The assumption underlying such systems is that
“the crowd” will explore available options so that we end up with accurate average ratings. Many
problems of this sort can be modeled using the formalism of multi-armed bandits. Free riding
also arises in online advertising. Each advertiser may be modeled as an agent with a context
vector describing its likely customers, and it must choose online niches in which to advertise. A
free rider can take advantage of competitors’ exploration of niches by monitoring impressions and
clickthroughs of their ads. In fact, there are a number of paid services (WhatRunsWhere, Adbeat,
SpyFu, etc.) that facilitate this behavior.
Multi-armed bandit problems model decision making under uncertainty [15, 12, 5]. Our focus
in this paper will be on the stochastic bandits model where there is an unknown reward distribution
associated with each arm, and the decision maker has to decide which arm to pull in each round.
Her goal is to minimize regret, the (expected) difference between the reward of the best arm and
the total reward she obtains. In the extension to the linear contextual bandits model, each arm i
has an unknown parameter vector θi ∈ Rd for i = 1, . . . , k, where k is the total number of arms. At
round t, a context xt ∈ Rd arrives. The expected reward for pulling arm i in round t is the inner
product 〈θi, xt〉.
In the simple stochastic case, there are two types of relevant information: the other agents’
actions and the resulting rewards. In the full-information setting, the free rider has access to both
types of information. We also consider a partial-information setting where the free rider can only
observe the other agents’ actions. For linear contextual bandits, the full-information setting also
includes the context vectors of the other agents.
In our setting, using YelpTM as the running example, the k arms correspond to restaurants.
Our model differs from standard bandit models in three significant ways. First, there are n decision
makers rather than one; in the YelpTM example, each decision maker corresponds to a diner. Upon
visiting a restaurant, a diner samples from a distribution to determine her dining experience. In the
stochastic setting, we assume that all diners have identical criteria for assessing their experiences,
meaning that identical samples lead to identical rewards. Second, in the linear contextual setting,
the contexts in our model are fixed in time and can be regarded as the types of the individual
decision makers. Each diner’s context vector represents the weight she assigns to various features
(parameters) of a restaurant, such as innovativeness, decor, noise level, suitability for vegetarians,
etc. Third, each arm has a distribution over parameter vectors instead of a fixed parameter vector.
When a diner visits a restaurant, her reward is determined by taking the inner product of her
context with a parameter vector drawn from the restaurant’s distribution, rather than by adding
sub-Gaussian noise to the inner product with a fixed parameter vector as in the standard model.
In the standard stochastic or linear contextual bandit setting, a decision-making algorithm is
called zero-regret if its regret over t rounds is o(t). It is well known that exploration is essential for
achieving zero regret [12]. One algorithm that achieves the asymptotically optimal regret bound
of O(log t) over t rounds is the so-called Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm of Lai and
Robbins [12]. In addition to maintaining a sample mean for each arm, this algorithm maintains
confidence intervals around these means, where the width of the confidence interval for arm i
drops roughly as 1/
√
ni where ni is the number of times arm i has been pulled so far. The UCB
algorithm then selects the arm with the highest upper limit to its confidence interval. There are
many other zero-regret strategies, such as Thompson sampling [16] or one where an initial round-
robin exploration phase is followed by an exploitation phase in which the apparently optimal arm
is pulled [8].
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Our results:
• In the stochastic setting a free rider can achieve O(1) regret under either of two reasonable
assumptions, both of which are satisfied by standard zero-regret algorithms:
– Some self-reliant agent has pulled each arm at least γ ln t times in expectation at all
sufficiently large times t, where γ is a constant derived from our analysis (Theorem 6).
– Some self-reliant agent is playing a strategy that with high probability achieves o(t)
realized regret. In this case, the free rider can achieve O(1) regret even in the partial-
information setting (Theorem 7). As a corollary, a free rider can achieve O(1) regret
whenever a self-reliant agent plays UCB (Corollary 8).
• For linear contextual bandits, a free rider can again achieve O(1) regret in the full-information
setting under an assumption similar to the first assumption above (Theorem 9).
• As a way of relating the two assumptions in the first bullet above, we prove that if a self-
reliant agent achieves O(t1−) regret, then that agent must pull each arm Ω(log t) times in
expectation (Theorem 3) and with a high probability that depends on  (Theorem 4).
• There is a deterministic lower bound of Ω(log t) on the number of times a UCB agent must
pull each arm in the stochastic case (Theorem 5).
• To achieve o(log t) regret in the contextual setting, the free rider must know both the contexts
and the observed rewards of the other agents (Theorems 10 and 11).
Related work: This paper asks how and when an agent may avoid doing their “fair share” of
exploration. Several recent works have studied how the cost of exploration in multi-armed bandit
problems is distributed, from the perspective of algorithmic fairness. Works by Bastani, Bayati,
and Khosravi [2]; Kannan, Morgenstern, Roth, Waggoner, and Wu [9]; and Raghavan, Slivkins,
Vaughan, and Wu [14] show that if the data is sufficiently diverse, e.g., if the contexts are randomly
perturbed, then exploration may not be necessary. Celis and Salehi [7] consider a model in both the
stochastic and the adversarial setting where each agent in the network plays a certain zero-regret
algorithm (UCB in the stochastic setting and EXP3 in the adversarial setting) and study how much
information an agent can gather from his neighbors.
There is some discussion in the economics literature of free riding in bandit settings. In the
model of Bolton and Harris [3], agents choose what fraction of each time unit to devote to a safe
action (exploitation) and to a risky action (exploration), and they show that while the attraction of
free riding drives agents to select the safe action always, risky action by a agent may enable every-
one to converge to the correct posterior belief faster. Keller, Rady, and Cripps [10] consider a very
similar setting where a risky arm will generates positive payoff after an exponentially distributed
random time; they characterize unique symmetric equilibrium as well as various asymmetric equi-
libria. Klein [11] gives conditions for complete learning in a two-agent, three-armed bandit setting
where there are two negatively-correlated risky arms and a safe arm, with further assumptions
about their behavior. It is clear that these models do not support having more than two arms (or
three in the case of [11]) and that their goal is maximizing expected reward, not minimizing regret.
Moreover, one arm is explicitly designated as the safe arm and the other(s) as risky, a priori.
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2 Preliminaries
Stochastic Model
There are k arms, indexed by [k] = {1, . . . , k} and n players or agents, indexed by [n]. Arm i has
a reward distribution Di supported on [−1, 1] with mean µi, and D = (D1, . . . , Dk) is the reward
distribution profile, or the stochastic bandit. The arm with the highest mean reward is denoted by
i∗ = arg maxi∈[k] µi, and we write µ∗ for µi∗ ; we assume that i∗ is unique. An important parameter
is ∆ = µ∗ −maxi∈[k]\{i∗} µi, the gap between optimal and suboptimal arms.
In round t = 1, 2, . . ., each player p selects an arm itp ∈ [k] and receives a reward rtp ∼ Ditp .
We write HT = ((itp, r
t
p)t∈[T ])p∈[n] to denote the history of all players’ actions and rewards through
round T . A policy or strategy for a player p is a function fp mapping each history to an arm or
to a distribution over the arms; a player p with policy fp who observes history H
T will pull arm
fp(H
T ) in round T + 1. A policy profile is a vector f = (f1, . . . , fn), where each fp is a policy for
player p. Notice that a policy profile and a stochastic bandit together determine a distribution on
histories. A policy fp for player p is self-reliant if it depends only on p’s own observed actions and
rewards. In contrast, a free-riding policy may use all players’ history.
The regret of player p at time T under stochastic bandit D is RTp (D, f) = Tµ
∗ −∑t∈[T ] E[rtp],
where the expectation is according to the distribution on histories determined by D and f .1 When
it will not introduce ambiguity, we simply write RTp or, in single-player settings, R
T . We also
consider the realized regret under a particular history HT , RˆTp (D, f) = Tµ
∗ −∑t∈[T ] rtp.
For any player p, arm i, and time t, the sample count is N tp,i, the number of times i has been
pulled by the player in the first t rounds, and the sample mean is µtp,i, the average of all of player
p’s samples of arm i through time t.
One well-studied self-reliant policy that achieves logarithmic regret in the stochastic setting is
called α-UCB [12], defined by
α-UCB(Ht) = arg max
i∈[k]
µti +
√
α ln(t+ 1)
2N ti
for all histories Ht. The parameter α calibrates the balance between exploration and exploitation.
For each arm i, a player using this policy maintains an upper confidence bound on µi, and in each
round, she pulls the arm with the highest upper confidence bound. The distance from each arm’s
sample mean to its upper confidence bound depends its sample count.
Linear Contextual Model
The linear contextual model generalizes the stochastic model. Now, each arm i has a feature dis-
tribution Fi supported on the d-dimensional closed unit ball, for some d ∈ N, and F = (F1, . . . , Fn)
is the feature distribution profile or contextual bandit. Each player p has a context xp ∈ Rd, and
x = (x1, . . . , xn) is the context profile. As before, in each round t, each player p selects an arm i
t
p,
but now the reward is given by sampling a feature vector θtp ∼ Fitp , and taking its inner product
with xp, i.e., r
t
p = 〈θtp, xp〉. Dp,i is the distribution of rewards from arm i for player p, and the mean
of this distribution is µp,i = Eθi∼Fi [〈θi, xp〉]. The optimal arm for player p is i∗p = arg maxi∈k µp,i.
Histories, policies, policy profiles, self-reliance, and free riding are defined exactly as in the
stochastic setting. The regret of player p through round T ∈ N under contextual bandit F, context
profile x, and policy profile f is given by RTp (F,x, f) = Tµ
∗
p−
∑
t∈[T ] E[rtp], where the expectation is
1Some sources refer to this quantity as pseudo-regret and use regret to refer to the realized regret.
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taken according to the distribution determined by F, x, and f . Notice that for a self-reliant player
p with context xp, the contextual bandit F = (F1, . . . , Fn) is equivalent to the stochastic bandit
D = (Dp,1, . . . , Dp,n).
Technical Lemmas from Other Sources
Some of our lower bounding arguments will use the following technical lemmas. KL denotes the
Kullback–Leibler divergence.
Lemma 1 (Divergence decomposition [13]). Let D = (D1, . . . , Dk) and D
′ = (D′1, . . . , D′k) be
stochastic bandits. For any policy f and time t,
KL(Ht(D, f), Ht(D′, f)) =
∑
i∈[k]
E[N ti (D, f)] KL(Di, D′i) .
Lemma 2 (Bretagnolle-Huber inequality [4], presented as in [13]). Let P and Q be probability
measures on the same measurable space, and let A be any event. Then,
P (A) +Q(Ac) ≥ 1
2
exp(−KL(P,Q)) ,
where Ac is the complement of A.
3 Lower Bounds on Sample Counts
If a self-reliant player has sampled an arm sufficiently many times, then a free rider with full
information can use those samples to find a good estimate of that arm’s mean. In this section, we
give three lower bounds on the sample counts of each arm.
Theorem 3 shows that if a policy guarantees O(T 1−) regret for some positive , then every
arm must be sampled Ω(log T ) times in expectation. We prove this using the method of Bubeck,
Perchet, and Rigollet [6], showing via the Bretagnolle-Huber inequality [4] that the learner cannot
rule out any arm’s optimality without sampling that arm Ω(log T ) times.
Theorem 3. Let f be any self-reliant policy such that RT = O(T 1−) for all stochastic bandits and
some  > 0. Then for all stochastic bandits with µ∗ < 1 and all i ∈ [k], f satisfies E[NTi ] = Ω(log T ).
Proof. Let k ≥ 1 and  > 0, and let f be any self-reliant policy satisfying RT (D, f) = O(T 1−) for
all k-arm stochastic bandits D. We prove that for all k-arm stochastic bandits D with µ∗ < 1 and
all i ∈ [k], we have E[NTi (D, f)] = Ω(lnT ).
Fix an arm i, and let X = E[NTi (D, f)]. If i is optimal, then X ≥ T − RT (D, f)/∆ and the
theorem holds. Hence, let i be any suboptimal arm, let δ = min
{
∆, 1−µ
∗
2
}
, let p = 1−µ
∗−δ
1−µi , and
let D′ = (D1, . . . , D′i, . . . , Dk), where for all x ∈ [−1, 1],
D′i(x) = p ·Di(x) + 1− p .
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Notice that the mean of D′i is µ
′
i = µ
∗ + δ and that KL(Di, D′i) ≤ ln(1/p). Now,
max{RT (D, f), RT (D′, f)} ≥ 1
2
(RT (D, f) +RT (D′, f))
≥ δ
2
T∑
t=1
(
Pr[it(D, f) = i] + Pr[it(D
′, f) 6= i])
≥ δ
4
T∑
t=1
exp(−KL(Ht−1(D, f), Ht−1(D′, f)))
≥ δT
4
exp(−KL(HT−1(D, f), HT−1(D′, f))) ,
where KL denotes Kullback-Leibler divergence and the second-to-last line follows from Lemma 2,
the Bretagnolle-Huber inequality [4]. By Lemma 1 [13],
KL(Ht−1(D, f), Ht−1(D′, f) = KL(Di, D′i) · E[NTi (D, f)]
≤ X ln(1/p) .
Thus, we have
max{RT (D, f), RT (D′, f)} ≥ δT
4
exp (−X ln(1/p)) .
It follows that exp(−X ln(1/p)) = O(T−) and therefore that X = Ω(lnT ).
In addition to a bound on the expected sample count, we sometimes need stronger guarantees
on the tail of the sample count distribution. In Theorem 4, we use a coupling argument to show
that if a policy has regret O(T 1−β) for relatively large β, then the probability that any arm that is
sampled too few times is small.
Theorem 4. Let f be any self-reliant policy such that RT = O(T 1−β) for all stochastic bandits and
some β > 0. Then for all stochastic bandits with µ∗ < 1, all i ∈ [k], and all γ > 0, f satisfies
Pr
(
NTi ≤ γ lnT
)
= O
(
T γci−β
)
,
where ci = ln
(
1−µ∗
2(1−µi)
)
.
Proof. Let α, β, γ, t0 > 0, and let f be a self-reliant policy such that for all stochastic bandits D
and all T > t0, R
T (D, f) ≤ αT 1−β. Let t1 ≥ t0 satisfy γ ln t1 < t1/2. Assume for contradiction
that there is some stochastic bandit D with µ∗ < 1, some arm i ∈ [k], and some T > t1 such that
Pr
(
NTi (D, f) ≤ γ lnT
)
>
Cα
T β+γ ln pi
, (1)
where C = 2min{∆,(1−µ∗)/2} and pi =
1−µ∗
2(1−µi) .
Observe that if i is the optimal arm in D, then since γ ln pi < 0, we have
RT (D, f) > ∆ · (T − γ lnT ) · Cα
T β+γ ln pi
≥ ∆ · (T − γ lnT ) · CαT−β
≥ αT 1−β ,
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contradicting the assumption that RT (D, f) ≤ αT 1−β. Hence, we assume that i is suboptimal.
We now construct a stochastic bandit D′ in which i is optimal. Let D′ = (D1, . . . , D′i, . . . , Dk),
where
D′i(x) = pi ·Di(x) + 1− pi
for all x ∈ [−1, 1]. Notice that the mean of D′i is µ′i = 1+µ
∗
2 , and that the gap between optimal and
suboptimal arms in D′ is ∆′ = µ′i − µ∗ = 1−µ
∗
2 .
We now use a coupling argument to bound Pr
(
NTi (D
′, f) ≤ γ lnT ). Observe that to sample
from D′i, one can sample a reward x ∼ Di, keep x with probability pi, and otherwise output 1.
Thus, for any history h in which i is pulled exactly s times,
Pr
(
HT (D′, f) = h
) ≥ psi · Pr (HT (D, f) = h) .
By summing over all such histories, we have
Pr
(
NTi (D
′, f) = s
) ≥ psi · Pr (NTi (D, f) = s) ,
and therefore
Pr
(
NTi (D
′, f) ≤ γ lnT ) = bγ lnT c∑
s=0
Pr
(
NTi (D
′, f) = s
)
≥
bγ lnT c∑
s=0
psi · Pr
(
NTi (D, f) = s
)
≥ pγ lnTi
bγ lnT c∑
s=0
Pr
(
NTi (D, f) = s
)
= T γ ln pi · Pr (NTi (D, f) ≤ γ lnT ) .
Combining this bound with inequality (1) yields
Pr
(
NTi (D
′, f) ≤ γ ln(T )) > T γ ln pi · Cα
T β+γ ln pi
= CαT−β .
Thus,
RT (D′, f) > CαT−β · (T − γ lnT ) · 1− µ
∗
2
≥ αT 1−β ,
which again contradicts the assumed regret bound on f .
Finally, we use a delicate inductive argument to prove the following deterministic guarantee on
the sample count for each arm when the arms are pulled according to the α-UCB policy.
Theorem 5. Let α > 0 and η > 2. There exists a constant t0 such that for all stochastic bandits,
all t ≥ t0, and all i ∈ [k], an agent playing the α-UCB policy must satisfy N t−1i ≥ α ln t/(2η2k2).
7
Proof. For every j ∈ [k] and t ∈ N, define the set
U tj =
{
i ∈ [k] : N t−1i ≥
α ln t
2η2j2
}
.
We claim that for all j ∈ [k] there is a constant tj such that for all t ≥ tj , |U tj | ≥ j.
We will prove this claim by induction on j. For any time t, there is clearly some arm i with
N t−1i ≥ t−1k , and we can choose t1 such that t−1k ≥ α ln t2η2k2 whenever t ≥ t1, so the claim holds for
j = 1.
Now fix j > 1, and assume that the claim holds for j − 1. Define a function gj : N→ R by
gj(t) = t− (k − j + 1) α ln t
2η2j2
.
We choose tj sufficiently large such that for all t ≥ tj we have gj(t) > tj−1 and
ln(gj(t)− 1)
ln t
>
(
1− 1− 2/η
j
)2
. (2)
Assume for contradiction that there is some time t ≥ tj such that |U tj | < j. Since U tj−1 ⊆ U tj ,
the inductive hypothesis then implies that U tj = U
t
j−1. Thus, |U tj | = j − 1, and there are exactly
k− j+ 1 arms outside of U tj . Each one of those arms has been pulled at most α ln t2η2j2 times by round
t − 1, so by the pigeonhole principle there is some s ∈ [gj(t)− 1, t− 1] such that an arm from U tj
is pulled in round s.
Furthermore, inequality (2) implies
α ln s
2η2(j − 1)2 >
α ln t
2η2j2
,
which guarantees that U sj−1 ⊆ U tj . Since s ≥ gj(tj) − 1 ≥ tj−1, the inductive hypothesis tells us
that |U sj−1| ≥ j − 1, so we have U sj−1 = U tj , meaning that the arm pulled in round s is also in U sj−1.
Now, N s−1i ≥ α ln s2η2(j−1)2 for all i ∈ U sj−1, so the upper confidence bound of the arm pulled at
time s is at most
1 +
√
α ln s
2α ln s/(2η2(j − 1)2) = 1 + η · (j − 1) .
The upper confidence bound at time s of any arm in [k] \ U tj is at least
−1 +
√
α ln s
2α ln t/(2η2j2)
= −1 + ηj
√
ln s
ln t
.
But since t ≥ tj and s ≥ gj(tj), inequality (2) implies
−1 + ηj
√
ln s
ln t
> 1 + η · (j − 1) .
This means that all arms outside of U tj have higher upper confidence bounds at time s than the
arms in U tj , contradicting the choice to pull an arm in U
t
j at time s.
By induction, we conclude that the claim holds for all j ∈ [k], and in particular that the theorem
holds with t0 = tk.
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4 Free Riding with Stochastic Bandits
Full-Information Case for Stochastic Bandits
Here we describe how a free rider can take advantage of the samples collected by another player
p who pulls every arm sufficiently many times in expectation. This free-riding policy, which we
call SampleAugmentingMeanGreedy, divides time into epochs of doubling length. In the jth
epoch, the free rider checks whether a given player p has observed at least γj samples of each
arm i ∈ [k], where γ is an appropriate constant. If all sample counts are sufficient, then the free
rider uses p’s observed rewards to estimate the mean of each arm, committing to the arm with
the maximum estimated mean for the remainder of the epoch. Otherwise, the free rider pulls any
under-sampled arms, augmenting all sample counts up to at least γj before proceeding. Doing this
allows the free rider to circumvent the logarithmic lower bound on regret and achieve O(1) regret.
Theorem 6. Fix a stochastic bandit, and suppose some player p plays a self-reliant policy that
satisfies E[N t−1i ] ≥ γ ln t for some γ > 2/∆2, all i ∈ [k], and all sufficiently large t. Then a free
rider can achieve O(1) regret.
Below, µˆsp,i denotes the average of the first s samples of Di observed by player p.
for j ∈ N do
t = 2j
for i ∈ [k] do
N = N2
j−1
p,i
if N ≥ γj then
// p sampled arm i enough prior to this epoch
νji = µˆ
sj
p,i
end
else
// the free rider samples arm i up to dγje −N times
νji = µˆ
N
p,i ·N/(dγje)
while N < sj and t < 2
j+1 − 1 do
it1 = i
νji = ν
j
i + r
t
1/s
N = N + 1
t = t+ 1
end
end
end
while t < 2j+1 − 1 do
it1 = arg maxi ν
j
i
t = t+ 1
end
end
Algorithm 1: SampleAugmentingMeanGreedyp,γ
Proof. Let D be a stochastic bandit and let let f be a self-reliant policy. Assume there are constants
γ > 2/∆2 and t0 such that E
[
N t−1i (D, f)
] ≥ γ ln t, for all i ∈ [k] and all t ≥ t0. Let f = (f1, . . . , fn)
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be a policy profile with f1 = SampleAugmentingMeanGreedyp,γ and fp = f , for some player
p ∈ {2, . . . , n}. We prove that RT1 (D, f) = O(1).
Let t′0 = 2dlog t0e. For all j ∈ N, define sj = γj ln 2 and i˜∗j = arg maxi νji . Then, letting ∆i
denote µ∗ − µi,
RT1 (D, f) =
∑
i 6=i∗
E
[
NT1,i(D, f)
]
∆i
≤ 2t′0 +
∑
i 6=i∗
∆i
 T∑
t=t′0
Pr[it1 = i]
 .
Now, for each i ∈ [k],
T∑
t=t′0
Pr[it1 = i] <
dlog T e∑
j=dlog t0e
(
max
{
0, sj − E
[
N2
j−1
p,i (D, f)
]}
+ Pr
[˜
i∗j = i
] · 2j)
=
dlog T e∑
j=dlog t0e
Pr
[˜
i∗j = i
] · 2j
≤
dlog T e∑
j=dlog t0e
(
Pr
[
νji − µi > ∆i/2
]
+ Pr
[
µ∗ − νji∗ > ∆i/2
])
· 2j
≤ 2
∞∑
j=0
exp
(
−2
(
∆i
2
)2
γj ln 2
)
· 2j
= 2
∞∑
j=0
2(1−∆
2γ/2)j .
Since ∆2γ/2 > 1, this sum converges to a constant, so RT1 (D, f) = O(1).
Partial-Information Case for Stochastic Bandits
We now show that a free rider can achieve constant regret by observing a player who plays any
policy that is unlikely to pull suboptimal arms too often. This class of policies includes UCB. We
consider a specific, natural free-riding policy CountGreedyp, defined by
CountGreedyp(H
t) = arg max
i∈[k]
N tp,i ,
which always pulls whichever arm i has been pulled most frequently by player p. Notice that this
policy does not require the free rider to observe player p’s rewards.
One might suspect that it would be sufficient for player p’s policy to achieve RTp = o(T ) in order
for the free rider to achieve constant regret under CountGreedy, but this turns out not to be the
case. It is possible for p to achieve logarithmic regret despite frequently pulling suboptimal arms
with non-trivial probability, preventing CountGreedy from achieving constant regret.
For instance, consider the self-reliant policy that, for j = 0, 1, 2 . . . , dictates the following
behavior in epochs of tripling length. With probability 1/3j , player p “gives up” on rounds 3j to
3j+1 − 1, choosing arm itp = arg mini µ3
j−1
i . Otherwise, with probability 1 − 1/3j , player p plays
α-UCB during those rounds. Under this policy, p’s regret grows at most logarithmically. Notice
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that whenever player p gives up, i3
j
p will become her most frequently pulled arm by round 2 · 3j ,
so the CountGreedyp-playing free rider will pull this arm at least 3
j times before round 3j+1.
It is routine to show that i3
j
p is suboptimal with probability 1−O(1/3j), so the free rider’s regret
through round T is at least RT1 ≥
∑blog3 T c
j=0 (1−O(1/3j)) ·∆ · 3j = Ω(T ).
Notice that by Theorem 5, the above policy satisfies the conditions of Theorem 6 when α is suffi-
ciently large, and therefore a free rider playing SampleAugmentingMeanGreedyp would achieve
constant regret in this situation. Intuitively, this is because the policy of sometimes giving up on
entire epochs is not “rational,” and SampleAugmentingMeanGreedy, unlike CountGreedy,
does not make any implicit assumption of rationality for the self-reliant player.
Since logarithmic regret for player p is not a strong enough assumption, we instead show that
if the realized regret RˆTp is sublinear with sufficiently high probability, then the free rider achieves
constant regret by playing CountGreedyp.
Theorem 7. Fix a stochastic bandit and assume there is some player p such that for all  > 0
there exists a w > 1 satisfying Pr(RˆTp ≥ T ) = O(T−w). Then a free rider playing CountGreedyp
achieves O(1) regret.
Proof. Let D be a stochastic bandit, let p ∈ {2, . . . , n} be a player, and let f = (f1, . . . , fn) be a
policy profile with f1 = CountGreedyp. Assume that for all  > 0 there is some w > 1 satisfying
Pr(RˆTp (D, f) ≥ T ) = O(T−w). We prove that RT1 (D, f) = O(1).
The free rider pulls a suboptimal arm at each time t if and only if CountGreedyp(H
t−1) 6= i∗,
which implies that N t−1p,i∗ ≤ t−12 and therefore RˆTp (D, f) ≥ ∆ t−12 . Hence, we can bound the free
rider’s regret by
RT1 (D, f) ≤ 2
T−1∑
t=0
Pr(Rˆtp(D, f) ≥ ∆t/2) .
If w > 1 satisfies Pr(Rˆtp(D, f) ≥ ∆t/2) = O(t−w), then we have
RT1 (D, f) ≤ 2
T−1∑
t=0
O(t−w) = O(1) .
Audibert, Munos, and Szepesva´ri [1] showed that α-UCB satisfies the probability bound of
Theorem 7 in the single-player setting whenever α > 1/2. Since α-UCB is a self-reliant policy, this
immediately yields the following corollary.
Corollary 8. If some player p’s policy is α-UCB for any α > 1/2, then a free rider playing
CountGreedyp achieves O(1) regret.
5 Free Riding with Contextual Bandits
Theorems 6 and 7 show that free riding is easy in the stochastic case, in which the reward dis-
tribution is identical for all players, but the task is more nuanced when players may have diverse
contexts. In the linear contextual setting, different players may have different optimal arms, so a
simple free-riding strategy like CountGreedy may fail, even when there are strong regret guar-
antees for the other players. In fact, as we show in Theorems 10 and 11, successful free riding in
this setting requires knowledge of both the contexts and the rewards of other players.
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Full-Information Cases for Contextual Bandits
We now consider the full-information setting where the free rider knows other players’ contexts,
actions, and rewards. We show that if the free rider’s context is a linear combination of the other
players’ contexts — and if other players pull all arms sufficiently many times — then the free rider
can aggregate other players’ observations to estimate the means of its own reward distribution
profile. In the event that some arm has not been sampled enough by some player, the free rider
temporarily acts self-reliantly and chooses arms according to UCB. Under the above assumptions,
this free-riding policy, UCBMeanGreedy, achieves O(1) regret. Formally, for every history Ht,
UCBMeanGreedyγ,c(H
t) =
{
arg maxi
∑n
p=2 cpµˆ
dγje
p,i if Sj
2-UCB
((
i2
j
1 , r
2j
1
)
, . . . ,
(
it1, r
t
1
))
otherwise ,
where j = blog tc, Sj is the event that N2j−1p,i ≥ γj for all p ∈ {2, . . . , n} and all i ∈ [k], and µˆsp,i
denotes the average of the first s observed samples of Dp,i. Notice that when applying UCB this
policy treats the bandit as stochastic and “starts from scratch” in each epoch, only considering the
free rider’s own actions and observed rewards from the current epoch.
Theorem 9. Let x be a context profile and c ∈ Rn−1 be a vector such that ∑np=2 cpxp = x1, Fix a
contextual bandit, let ∆ be the gap for player 1, and suppose that  > 0 and γ > 8〈c,c〉 ln 2
∆2
satisfy
Pr(N t−1p,i < γ log t) = O((log t)
−2−)
for every player p ∈ {2, . . . , n} and arm i ∈ [k]. Then a free rider playing UCBMeanGreedyγ,c
achieves O(1) regret.
Proof. Fix j ∈ N, let epoch j be rounds 2j through 2j+1 − 1, and let sj = dγje. For each i ∈ [k]
let µ˜ji =
∑n
p=2 cpµˆ
sj
p,i, and let i˜
j = arg maxi µ˜
j
i . We analyze the free rider’s regret incurred during
epoch j in each of the following cases: (1) Sj and i˜
j = i∗1, (2) Sj and i˜j 6= i∗1, and (3) ¬Sj .
Notice that i˜j is defined in the first and second cases. In case (1), the free rider incurs no regret
during epoch j because it pulls only the optimal arm i∗1 during that epoch. We now analyze the
regret incurred from the other two cases.
For case (2),
Pr(˜ij 6= i∗1) ≤
∑
i∈[k]
Pr
(∣∣∣µ˜ji − µ1,i∣∣∣ ≥ ∆2
)
.
For fixed i ∈ [k], letting rˆsp,i denote the value of the sth observed sample of Dp,i, we have∣∣∣µ˜ji − µ1,i∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
p=2
cp
sj
sj∑
s=1
rˆsp,i −
n∑
p=2
cpµp,i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
p=2
sj∑
s=1
Xsp
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where Xsp =
cp
sj
(
rˆsp,i − µp,i
)
. Notice that the Xsp are independent, and each X
s
p is supported on
[−cp/sj , cp/sj ] with E[Xsp ] = 0, so Hoeffding’s lemma gives
E[exp(λXsp)] ≤ exp
(
λ2c2p
2s2j
)
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for all λ ∈ R. Let λ = 4j ln 2∆ , and apply a Chernoff bound:
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
p=2
sj∑
s=1
Xsp
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∆2
 ≤ 2 exp(−λ∆
2
)
E
 n∏
p=2
sj∏
s=1
exp(λXsp)

= 2 exp
(
−λ∆
2
) n∏
p=2
sj∏
s=1
E[exp(λXsp)]
≤ 2 exp
−λ∆
2
+
n∑
p=2
sj∑
s=1
λ2c2p
2s2j

≤ 2 exp
(
λ
2
(
λ
γj
〈c, c〉 −∆
))
= 2 exp
(
2j ln 2
(
4〈c, c〉 ln 2
γ∆2
− 1
))
.
Thus, the contribution of this case to the regret during epoch j is at most
k · 21+2j
(
4〈c,c〉 ln 2
γ∆2
−1
)
· 2j+1 = k · 22+j·
(
8〈c,c〉 ln 2
γ∆2
−1
)
= k · 2−Ω(j) ,
since γ > 8〈c,c〉 ln 2
∆2
.
For the case (3), observe that
Pr(¬Sj) ≤
n∑
p=2
k∑
i=1
Pr(N2
j−1
p,i < γj)
= O(nkj−2−) ,
by assumption. In this case, UCBMeanGreedyγ,c resorts to playing α-UCB for 2
j steps, incurring
O(j) regret. Thus, the third case contributes O(nkj−1−) to the expected regret of epoch j.
Therefore, for any time horizon T ∈ N, the regret incurred by the free rider is bounded by
∞∑
j=0
(
k · 2−Ω(j) +O(nkj−1−)
)
,
which converges to a constant.
Partial-Information Cases for Contextual Bandits
Now we consider a situation where player 1 must choose a free-riding policy without knowledge of
the other players’ contexts. We show that this restriction can force the free rider to incur logarithmic
regret even given knowledge of the other players’ policies, actions, and rewards. Intuitively, this is
true because a self-reliant player might behave identically in two different environments, making
observations of their behavior useless to the free rider. To prove the theorem, we construct a one-
dimensional, two-arm example of two such environments, then appeal to the lower bound technique
of Bubeck et al. [6] to show that the free rider must incur Ω(log T ) regret when acting self-reliantly.
Theorem 10. A free rider without knowledge of the other players’ contexts may be forced to incur
RT = Ω(log T ) regret, regardless of what self-reliant policies the other players employ.
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Proof. We prove that there exist a pair of contextual bandits F and F′ and a pair of two-player
context profiles x and x′ such that, for every time horizon T and every policy profile f = (f1, f2)
in which f1 is independent of player 2’s context and f2 is self-reliant,
max{RT1 (F,x, f), RT1 (F′,x′, f)} ≥
ln(T/12) + 1
2
. (3)
We construct a one-dimensional, two-arm, two-player example. Let F1 be a point mass at 0; let F2
and F ′2 be discrete random variables that take value 1 with probability 1/3 and 2/3, respectively,
and value −1 otherwise; and let F = (F1, F2) and F′ = (F1, F ′2). Let f = (f1, f2) be any linear
contextual bandit policy profile such that f2 is self-reliant, and consider a free-riding player 1.
Let x = (1, 1) and x′ = (1,−1). For p, i ∈ [2], let Dp,i be the reward distribution of arm i
for player p under contextual bandit F and context profile x. Similarly, let D′p,i be the reward
distribution of arm i for player p under parameter distribution profile F′ and context profile x′.
Observe that D1,1 = D
′
1,1, D2,1 = D
′
2,1, and D2,2 = D
′
2,2, but D1,2 = −D′1,2.
Informally, the environment (F,x,x) is indistinguishable from (F′,x′, f) from the perspective
of player 2. Observing player 2’s actions and rewards will therefore be completely uninformative
for player 1, who is ignorant of player 2’s context. Thus, player 1’s task is essentially equivalent
to a single-player stochastic bandit problem where the learner must distinguish between reward
distribution profiles (D1,1, D1,2) and (D
′
1,1, D
′
1,2). Bubeck et al. [6] showed that the latter task
requires the learner to experience logarithmic regret. Adapting their proof to the present situation,
we can demonstrate that (3) holds. Our situation is almost identical to theirs, except for the
presence of an uninformative second player, which requires only minor changes to their proof. We
include the details here for the sake of completeness:
Let A = (F,x, f) and B = (F′,x′, f) be the two environments. Observe that
max{RT1 (A), RT1 (B)} ≥
E[NT1,2(A)]
3
,
and
max
{
RT1 (A), R
T
1 (B)
} ≥ 1
2
(
RT1 (A) +R
T
1 (B)
)
=
1
6
T∑
t=1
(
Pr[it1(A) = 1] + Pr[i
t
1(B) = 2]
)
≥ 1
12
T∑
t=1
exp(−KL(Ht(A), Ht(B)))
≥ T
12
exp(−KL(HT (A), HT (B))) ,
where the second-to-last line follows from the Bretagnolle-Huber inequality (Lemma 2) [4].
We now calculate KL((HT (A), HT (B)). Observe that (it2(A), r
t
2(A))t∈[T ] and (it2(B), rt2(B))t∈[T ],
player 2’s components of the history in environments A and B, are distributed identically. This
means that the conclusion of Lemma 1 [13] still applies. In particular, by the chain rule for
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divergence,
KL
(
(HT (A), HT (B)
)
=
T∑
t=1
E
[
KL
((
(it1(A), r
t
1(A)) | Ht−1(A)
)
,
(
(it1(B), r
t
1(B)) | Ht−1(B)
))]
=
T∑
t=1
E[KL
(
D1,f1(Ht−1(A)), D1,f1(Ht−1(B))
)
]
=
T∑
t=1
Pr[f1(H
t−1(A)) = 2] ·KL(D2, D′2)
= KL(D2, D
′
2)E[NT1,2(A)]
= E[NT1,2(A)]/3 .
Thus, we have
max{RT1 (A), RT1 (B)} ≥
1
2
(
E[NT1,2(A)]
3
+
T
12
exp(−E[NT1,2(A)]/3)
)
≥ 1
6
min
x∈[0,T ]
(
x+
Te−x/3
4
)
=
ln(T/12) + 1
2
.
Similarly, a free rider in the contextual setting needs to know the other players’ rewards; knowing
their contexts, policies, and actions may not be sufficient to successfully free ride, even when all
other players have low realized regret with high probability and are guaranteed to pull all arms
frequently. This is in contrast to the stochastic case, as Theorem 7 demonstrates. We prove this
by describing a self-reliant policy, EpochExploreThenCommit, that again proceeds in doubling
epochs. At the beginning of the jth epoch, the player samples each arm Θ(j) times, then commits
to the arm with the highest sample mean for the remainder of the epoch. This policy has strong
guarantees on sample count and realized regret, but we construct an example where, with constant
probability, the sequence of arm pulls is completely uninformative to the free rider.
Theorem 11. A free rider without knowledge of the other players’ rewards may be forced to incur
RT = Ω(log T ) regret, even when all other players satisfy the conditions of Theorems 6 and 7.
Proof. Fix γ ≥ 2/∆2, and let gγ = EpochExploreThenCommitγ . We prove that gγ satisfies the
following three properties:
1. For all contextual bandits F, context profiles x, and policy profiles f = (f1, . . . , fn) with
fp = gγ , there is some t0 ∈ N such that NTp,i(F,x, f) ≥ γ log T for all i ∈ [k] and all T > t0.
2. For all contextual bandits F, context profiles x, policy profiles f = (f1, . . . , fn) with fp = gγ ,
and  > 0, there is some w > 1 such that Pr
(
RˆTp (F,x, f) ≥ T
)
= O(T−w).
3. There exist a pair of contextual bandits F and F′ and a context profile x such that for all
policy profiles f = (f1, gγ , gγ) such that f1 is independent of the other players’ observed
rewards, max
{
RT1 (F,x, f), R
T
1 (F
′,x, f)
}
= Ω(log T ).
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t = 1
for j ∈ N do
for i ∈ [k] do
Ni = 0
µˆji = 0
while Ni < γ(j + 2) and t < 2
j+1 − 1 do
it = i
µˆji = µˆ
j
i +
rt
γ(j+1)
t = t+ 1
end
end
iˆ∗ = arg maxi∈[k] µˆ
j
i
while t < 2j+1 − 1 do
it = iˆ∗
t = t+ 1
end
end
Algorithm 2: EpochExploreThenCommitγ
First, let j0 ∈ N satisfy 2j0 ≥ kγ(j0 + 2), and let i ∈ [k] be any arm. Then, for all j ≥ j0, f
satisfies N2
j
p,i(F,x, f) ≥ γ(j+1), i.e., each arm has been pulled at least γ(j+1) times at the beginning
of the epoch. So for every round t in the jth epoch, we have N tp,i(F,x, f) ≥ γ(j+1) ≥ γ log t. Hence,
NTp,i(F,x, f) ≥ γ log T for all T > 2j0 , so gγ satisfies the first property.
Now, for each j ∈ N, define R˜j = Rˆ2j+1−1 − Rˆ2j−1, the realized regret incurred during epoch
j while playing gγ . At most 2kγ(j + 2) of this realized regret can come from the exploration
phase; any further regret in that epoch can only result from committing to a suboptimal arm. By
Hoeffding’s inequality,
Pr
(
R˜j > 2kγ(j + 2)
)
≤
∑
i∈[k]
exp
(
−γ(j + 2)(µ
∗ − µi)2
2
)
≤ k · exp
(
−γ(j + 2)∆
2
2
)
.
Notice that
∑blog(T )c−2
j=0 R˜
j ≤∑T/4t=1 2 = T2 , and that dlog T e − (blog(T )c − 2) ≤ 4− log . So
Pr
(
RˆT ≥ T
)
≤ Pr
 dlog T e∑
j=blog(T )c−1
R˜j ≥ T
2

≤
dlog T e∑
j=blog(T )c−1
Pr
(
R˜j ≥ T
8− 2 log 
)
.
For all sufficiently large T , 2kγ(dlog T e+ 2) < T8−2 log  , so for j = blog(T )c − 1, . . . , dlog T e,
Pr
(
R˜j ≥ T
8− 2 log 
)
≤ Pr
(
R˜j > 2kγ(j + 2)
)
≤ k · exp
(
−γ(blog(T )c+ 1)∆
2
2
)
.
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Thus,
Pr
(
RˆT ≥ T
)
≤ (4− log ) · k · exp
(
−γ(blog(T )c+ 1)∆
2
2
)
= O
(
T−
γ∆2
2
)
,
meaning that γ∆
2
2 > 1. So gγ satisfies the second property.
Finally, let x = ((
√
2/2,
√
2/2), (1, 0), (0, 1)) be a three-player context profile, and let F be
the contextual bandit where for each i ∈ [3], the feature distribution Fi satisfies Fi(xi) = 2/3
and Fi(−xi) = 1/3, and F4 is a point mass at (0, 0). Define a second contextual bandit F′ =
(F ′1, F2, F3, F4), where F ′1(x1) = 1/3 and F ′1(−x1) = 2/3. Let f1 be some policy that is independent
of the other players’ observed rewards, and consider the policy profile f = (f1, gγ , gγ).
6 Simulations
Figure 1: Average realized regret of a 2-UCB player and a free rider over 100 simulations. There
are 10 arms whose reward distributions are Bernoulli, with parameters 0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.8, 0.9.
Finally, we present simulation results for both the stochastic and the contextual cases. In the
stochastic case, we have the free rider simply pull the most pulled arm of the self-reliant player,
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Figure 2: Average realized regret of the free rider over 10 simulations. There are 50 players playing
10-UCB and 30 arms, the dimension of the vectors is 10, and ∆ = 0.1839.
and in the contextual case, we have the free rider pull the arm with the highest sample mean
calculated by taking the linear combination of the sample means from the other players. In each of
the experiments, we refer to maxi∈[k]
∑T
t=1 r
t,i −∑Tt=1 rtp as the realized regret for player p, where
rt,i is the reward one would have observed by pulling arm i in round t. For the stochastic case,
we consider situations where the reward distribution Di of each arm i is Bernoulli, with different
parameters p. As shown in Figure 1, the realized regret of the free rider flattens out after some
constant number of rounds, where this constant depends on the reward distribution profile D.
In the contextual case, the context xp for each player p and the vector c (i.e., the coefficients for
the linear combination of other players’ contexts that gives the free rider’s context), are all chosen
uniformly at randomly from [−1, 1]. The feature distribution Fi for each arm i is a multi-variate
normal distribution with covariance matrix is 0.1I, where I is the identity matrix, and the mean
vector is once again chosen by sampling each coordinate uniformly from [−1, 1]. We normalize xp
and the mean vector of Fi so that the expected reward for each arm i falls within [−1, 1] for every
player p.
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7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that in the linear contextual setting, a free rider can successfully shirk the
burden of exploration, achieving constant regret by observing other players engaged in standard
learning behavior. Furthermore, we have shown that even with partial information and weaker
assumptions on the other players’ learning behaviors, the free rider can achieve constant regret
in the simple stochastic setting. It would be interesting to examine richer settings. For example,
exploring players need not be self-reliant, and both exploring players and free riders could play
a range of strategies. As another example, when a free rider in the stochastic setting only sees
the actions (and not the rewards) of the self-reliant players and does not know which of them are
playing UCB or other zero-regret strategies, can he still achieve constant regret? More realistically,
users of a service like YelpTM cannot be partitioned into self-reliant public learners and selfish free
riders who keep their data private. It would be interesting to explore more nuanced player roles
and to characterize the equilibria that arise from their interactions. Such a characterization might
also suggest mechanisms for the deterrence of free riding or for incentivizing exploration.
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